Reflections on the Many-Worlds Interpretation, quantum physics and the nature of reality
By David Elboth | November 2026
A fascinating question after nearly 50 years
I have been reading Scientific American for almost 50 years. Over the decades, the magazine has introduced me to countless scientific discoveries, new theories and occasionally rather controversial ideas.
An article by physicist Philipp Strasberg, entitled The Case for Many Worlds, in the November 2026 issue particularly caught my attention.
The suggestion is extraordinary: when a quantum event has several possible outcomes, all those outcomes may actually occur, but in different branches of reality.
In other words, there could be countless versions of our universe, each following a different history.
Having spent much of my academic and professional life working with physics and technology, I have learned to appreciate both the extraordinary power of mathematical models and the importance of questioning what those models actually tell us about nature.
Reading Strasberg’s article brought me back to a question that has fascinated physicists for generations:
Are we describing physical reality, or are we sometimes interpreting our mathematical models too literally?
I believe this distinction deserves closer examination.
What does quantum mechanics actually tell us?
Quantum mechanics is among the most successful scientific theories ever developed.
It describes the behaviour of atoms, electrons, photons and other microscopic systems with extraordinary accuracy. Without it, much of modern electronics, semiconductor technology, lasers and our understanding of matter would simply not exist.
Yet there is something remarkable about quantum mechanics.
While its mathematical predictions are exceptionally successful, physicists still disagree about what the theory tells us about physical reality.
Consider a simple experiment.
An electron can be prepared in a quantum state that allows two possible measurement results. Before measurement, the theory describes these possibilities together in what is called a superposition.
When we perform the measurement, however, we observe just one result.
This raises a question that has troubled physicists for generations:
What happens to the other possibility?
Quantum superposition is not speculation. It is a well-established and experimentally verified feature of quantum mechanics.
But there is a considerable conceptual leap from demonstrating superposition in a laboratory to concluding that every possible measurement outcome exists in a different physical world.
The Many-Worlds answer
In 1957, physicist Hugh Everett III proposed an unconventional approach to the measurement problem.
Perhaps nothing disappears when a quantum measurement takes place.
Instead, the complete quantum state continues to evolve according to the normal equations of quantum mechanics, without any special collapse during measurement.
The observer and the measuring instrument become part of the quantum description.
In the Many-Worlds Interpretation, different measurement outcomes correspond to different branches of the overall quantum state.
Each observer experiences one definite outcome, even though the complete mathematical description contains the other outcomes as well.
Imagine measuring an electron with two possible results.
In one branch, the instrument records the first result. In another, it records the second.
Both branches are part of the same mathematical description, but the observers within them can no longer ordinarily access each other’s measurement records.
It is an elegant idea in one important respect: it avoids introducing a separate physical rule that causes the wavefunction to collapse.
But elegance alone is not sufficient to establish that a theory describes physical reality.
What about decoherence?
One of the most important developments supporting modern Many-Worlds theories comes from a phenomenon called decoherence.
Quantum systems do not normally exist in complete isolation. They interact with their surroundings — with light, air molecules, measuring instruments and countless other physical systems.
These interactions spread quantum information into the environment.
As a result, interference between different possible outcomes becomes extremely difficult to observe.
To us, the world appears to have definite properties rather than behaving like a visible quantum superposition.
Decoherence is not merely a philosophical idea. It is a well-established physical phenomenon supported by experiments.
It also helps explain why quantum interference is much easier to observe in carefully isolated microscopic systems than in everyday objects.
However, there is an important distinction.
Decoherence explains why interference between different outcomes becomes practically unobservable. It does not, on its own, explain why an individual observer experiences one particular outcome rather than another.
Many-Worlds offers one answer: each observer experiences a definite outcome within a particular branch.
In this interpretation, the branches are not additional objects artificially inserted into the theory. They are understood as effectively independent structures emerging from the evolution of the universal quantum state.
Whether these structures should be regarded as physically real worlds remains a matter of interpretation.
The disagreement is not about whether decoherence occurs. It concerns what decoherence tells us about reality.
Are mathematical possibilities physical realities?
This is where I find the discussion particularly interesting.
Physics depends on mathematics. We construct mathematical models, compare their predictions with observations and improve them when necessary.
But there is an important distinction between a mathematical description and the physical world it represents.
The wavefunction is central to quantum mechanics. It allows us to calculate the probabilities of measurement outcomes with astonishing accuracy.
Yet physicists disagree about whether the wavefunction is itself a complete description of physical reality or represents something more limited.
The Many-Worlds Interpretation takes a particularly strong position: the universal quantum state evolves continuously, and the effectively independent branches arising from this evolution correspond to physically real alternatives.
This is a coherent possibility.
But accepting it involves a particular understanding of what the mathematical structure represents.
Throughout the history of physics, mathematical models have sometimes suggested possibilities that were later confirmed by observation.
At other times, elegant mathematical ideas have turned out not to describe nature.
We should therefore be careful not to confuse mathematical consistency with experimental confirmation.
What would parallel universes mean for software developers?
Let me introduce a rather different example, one that may be particularly familiar to software developers, programmers and IT architects.
Imagine that I am working on a Python application.
After several hours of programming, I discover a bug. I examine the source code, identify the problem and correct it.
The application now works as intended.
But suppose the Many-Worlds Interpretation is literally correct.
Could there be another branch of reality in which a different version of me never discovered the bug?
And another in which I decided to rewrite the entire application?
Perhaps yet another in which I chose a completely different programming language?
We must be careful here.
Many-Worlds does not claim that every imaginable human decision automatically creates a separate universe. Branching arises through quantum evolution and decoherence, not simply because someone makes a choice.
Nevertheless, if quantum events influence our actions, the interpretation allows different macroscopic histories to develop in different branches.
That raises some fascinating questions.
Would two versions of the same software project gradually develop different architectures?
Would one version contain security vulnerabilities that had been eliminated in another?
Could two initially identical IT systems eventually become completely different?
And perhaps most importantly:
If these different versions of reality physically exist, what exactly does that mean for the information stored within them?
We are accustomed to working with alternative branches in software development. Git allows us to create different versions of a project, compare changes and merge improvements.
But Git branches are accessible information structures stored on physical computers.
The branches proposed by Many-Worlds are something fundamentally different.
They are effectively non-interfering components of a universal quantum state, not parallel computer systems between which we can exchange files.
There is no established mechanism by which a programmer could retrieve a better algorithm, recover lost source code or copy a solution from another macroscopic quantum branch.
Quantum interference can, in principle, reveal relationships between different components of a quantum state. Under carefully controlled conditions, coherence can even be restored.
But that is very different from accessing another version of our everyday world.
I find the comparison with software development useful because it highlights the distinction between a mathematical possibility, an information structure and a physically observable reality.
It also leads back to the central question:
If countless alternative histories exist but cannot ordinarily be accessed or compared, what experimental evidence could establish that they are physically real?
Can experiments settle the question?
In recent years, experimental physicists have demonstrated increasingly sophisticated control over quantum systems.
Larger and more complex systems can exhibit quantum interference, and effects once thought impossible to observe have become accessible in laboratories.
These achievements are remarkable.
They strengthen our confidence that quantum mechanics applies far beyond individual electrons and photons.
However, there is a distinction between demonstrating quantum superposition and demonstrating the physical existence of parallel universes.
Many-Worlds and several competing interpretations reproduce the same standard quantum predictions.
Consequently, an experiment confirming those predictions does not necessarily distinguish between the interpretations.
Some proposed alternatives to standard quantum mechanics, particularly certain objective-collapse models, predict small deviations that may be experimentally tested.
Such experiments could help determine whether conventional quantum evolution remains valid at increasingly large scales.
This is important scientific progress.
However, confirming the validity of standard quantum evolution would not automatically establish Many-Worlds as the only possible interpretation.
The central question remains: can we identify observations that distinguish genuinely different descriptions of physical reality?
The problem of probability
There is another interesting difficulty.
Imagine a quantum experiment with two possible outcomes, each assigned a probability of 50 per cent by the usual quantum rules.
According to Many-Worlds, both outcomes occur in different branches.
But if both outcomes happen, what exactly does it mean to say that each has a 50 per cent probability?
In conventional applications of quantum mechanics, the mathematical rules tell us the likelihood of obtaining a particular measurement result.
In Many-Worlds, however, we must explain why an observer should use those same probabilities when all outcomes occur within the overall quantum state.
Supporters of Many-Worlds have developed sophisticated arguments based on decision theory, uncertainty and the mathematical weights associated with different branches.
These arguments attempt to recover the familiar Born rule, which relates quantum probabilities to the squared amplitudes of the wavefunction.
They are an important part of modern research.
Nevertheless, there remains disagreement about whether they provide a completely satisfactory explanation without relying on additional assumptions.
This does not mean that Many-Worlds is wrong.
It means that some of its deepest conceptual questions remain open.
My perspective
I find the Many-Worlds Interpretation intellectually fascinating.
It takes the mathematics of quantum mechanics seriously and attempts to explain measurement without introducing a special collapse mechanism.
That is a considerable attraction.
At the same time, I remain cautious about moving from a highly successful mathematical framework to strong claims about the physical existence of countless parallel universes.
Personally, I am not yet convinced that the physical existence of these worlds has been established simply because they arise within a particular interpretation of the mathematics.
This does not mean that Many-Worlds is wrong.
It means that I would like to see stronger evidence before accepting such an extraordinary description of reality.
For me, three questions remain particularly important:
- Does the universal wavefunction represent physical reality in its entirety, or is that an assumption we have chosen to make?
- Does decoherence establish the existence of multiple physical worlds, or does it explain why different quantum alternatives cease to interfere in practice?
- Can we identify an experiment that genuinely distinguishes Many-Worlds from other interpretations making the same predictions?
These questions are not arguments against quantum mechanics.
On the contrary, they illustrate how much there is still to understand about one of our most successful scientific theories.
A final thought
More than a century after the foundations of quantum mechanics were established, we can calculate the behaviour of microscopic systems with extraordinary precision.
We can build quantum computers, manipulate individual atoms and explore quantum effects in increasingly complex systems.
Yet we still debate what the mathematical equations mean.
Perhaps parallel universes really do exist.
Perhaps future discoveries will reveal a very different picture.
But until we can distinguish these possibilities experimentally, I believe we should remain cautious about treating interpretation as established physical reality.
The equations of quantum mechanics work extraordinarily well. But do they really tell us that countless other versions of ourselves exist — perhaps even writing different versions of the same software, making different decisions and living entirely different lives?
And if those alternative realities exist but remain beyond our practical ability to observe or communicate with them, how could we ever establish their existence?
That question, at least for me, remains unanswered.
And perhaps that is one of the reasons why physics remains so fascinating.
Further reading and references
- Strasberg, Philipp (2026). The Case for Many Worlds: New quantum physics experiments make it seem increasingly likely that we live in a multiverse. Scientific American, Vol. 335, Issue 4, November 2026, p. 42 (first page). DOI: 10.1038/scientificamerican112026-2VvsjCNymcKjUuRqvth6C7. Online article: Why We Probably Live in a Quantum Multiverse.
- Everett, Hugh III (1957). “Relative State” Formulation of Quantum Mechanics. Reviews of Modern Physics, 29, 454–462. DOI: 10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454.
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Everettian Quantum Mechanics.
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Role of Decoherence in Quantum Mechanics.